Carl von Clausewitz
Samuel Adams
Is the political objective understood or accepted by the military leader? If not, strategy drives policy or the military conception of victory supersedes political conception. Clausewitz maintains: “War cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense.”
Thomas Jefferson
Most of the rhetoric that pushed America into the war was against high-handed British arrogance at sea, its support and encouragement of Indian attacks against American settlers, and its inability to recognize that America no longer belonged to them. Many Americans, Britons, and for the first time and last time, people who called themselves Canadians would die in a war against each other. Most of them were English-speaking. It was an unnecessary war, but it would ultimately change and make not just the United States but Canada as well
Michael Collins
The British successfully put down one uprising after another over the centuries. With this success, British leadership came to assume that future rebellions by the Irish would be brought under control without having to make changes in the political status of either. The reality was without improved relations between the Irish People and themselves; the subsequent rebellion would have different consequences. Their plans to continue control of Ireland seemed to unravel as the Easter uprising of 1916 unfolded.
Harry S. Truman
There were several issues under dispute between President Truman and General MacArthur during the Korean War that directly relate to these ‘Clausewitzian’ precepts. As Theater Commander during part of the Korean War, MacArthur, an unparalleled military strategist, disagreed with Truman’s political objectives for victory; maintaining South Korean independence by pushing back North Korean military forces above the 38 th parallel and the policy of ‘collective security’ within the United Nations were insufficient for victory. MacArthur demanded alternate courses of action. Although Theater Commanders and Presidents have differed in the past, MacArthur went ‘public’ on what he determined Truman’s strategy for defeat and his strategy for victory was. The Truman Administration believed these actions would have the opposite effect—that they would draw China directly into the conflict and possibly start a Third World War.
Robert S. McNamara, “In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam."
Secretary of Defense McNamara, President Johnsons principal architect of the strategy for victory in Vietnam, recalled in his memoirs the mistakes he made and sincerely regretted: "I clearly erred by not forcing, then (1965), or late in either Saigon or Washington a knock-down, drag-out debate over the loose assumptions, unmade questions, and thin analysis understanding our military strategy in Vietnam. I had spent twenty years as a manager identifying problems and forcing organizations, often against their will, to think deeply and realistically about the alternative course of action and their consequences. I doubt I will ever fully understand why I did not do so here."
Charles Pope
Vice President Richard Cheney went from providing the prophetic words as Secretary of Defense in February 1992 to support the invasion of Iraq in 2003. He describes the specific issues that would have to be addressed before any political goals could be met: "If we had gone to Baghdad [during the First Gulf War] and got rid of Saddam Hussein … Then you have got to put a new government in his place and then you are faced with the question of what kind of government are you to establish in Iraq? Is it going to be a Kurdish government, a Shia government, or a Sunni government? How many forces are you going to have to leave there to keep it propped up, how many casualties are you going to take through the course of this operation?”